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JURISDICTION 
This case is on appeal fiom a final oidei enteied on Januaiy 27, 1999, by Judge Pat 
B Rn in of the Thud Judicial Distnct Couit in and foi Summit County, State of Utah 
!UM diction of this Couit is appiopnate puisuant to Utah Constitution ait VIII, sec 3, and 
UtalUode Ann §78-2-2(1998) 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1 Did the tiial couit en m dnecting a veidict against plaintiffs' indemnification 
Uauns on the basis of its belief that theie was no evidence of damages, wheie the tiial couit 
tailed to \ lew the evidence in the light most favoiable to plaintiffs, ovetlooked e\ idence in 
the iccoid of \anous unieimbuised expenses and losses co\eied b) the Indemnification 
\g\ cement and mistakenly focused instead on plaintiffs' piofit on the sale of the undei lying 
'o\\ niopeitv which in no wa\ lediessed the unieimbuised losses foi which plaintiffs weie 
indemnified and entitled to lecovei9 
Standard of Re\iew: 
fc[0]n appeal fiom a dnected veidict, we must examine the e\ idence in the light most 
laxoiable to the losing paity, and if theie is a leasonable basis in the evidence and in the 
inleien.es to be diawn theiefiom that would support a judgment in fa\oi of the losing part) 
the dnected veidict cannot be sustained ,M Gouidmv Shaion's Cultuial Educ Recieational 
Assoc (S45 P 2d 242, 243 (Utah 1992) (quoting Management Comm v Giaystone Pines, 
(o2 P 2d 896 898 (Utah 1982)) 
1 
2. Did the trial court err in directing a verdict and dismissing plaintiffs' 
indemnification claims on the grounds that plaintiffs allegedly did not introduce evidence of 
actual damages, where defendant's breach of the Indemnification Agreement in itself entitled 
plaintiffs to recover nominal damages? 
Standard of Review: 
"[OJn appeal from a directed verdict, 'we must examine the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the 
lnlerenees 10 be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in favor of the losing party, 
the dnected verdict cannot be sustained."' Gourdin v. Sharon's Cultural Educ. Recreational 
Assoc. 845 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1992) (quoting Management Comm. v. Graystone Pines, 
652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982)). 
3. Did the trial court err in directing a verdict and dismissing plaintiffs' claims 
of breach of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement by failing to find that defendant's promises 
contained theiem to make various improvements to the property after closing were promises 
collateral to the contract of sale, and thus, were not extinguished by the merger doctrine nor 
by the Agreement's abrogation clause? 
Standard of Review: 
"[0]n appeal from a directed verdict, 'we must examine the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the 
infeiences to be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in favor of the losing party, 
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the dncctcd veidict cannot be sustained "' Gouidin v Shaion' s Cultuial Educ Recieational 
V s^oc , 845 P 2d 242, 243 (Utah 1992) (quoting Management Comm v Giaystone Pines, 
(o2 P 2d 896 898 (Utah 1982)) 
4 In light of the tnal couit's impiopei giant of dnected \eidict, did the tnal couit 
ilso en in aw aiding attorneys fees to defendant? 
Standard of Review: 
Whethei attorney fees aie iecoveiablc in an action is a question of law, which we 
icuew foi conectness " Valcaicev Fitzgeiald, 961 P 2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998) See also 
Robeitson v Gem Ins Co
 : 828 P 2d 496, 499 (Utah Ct App 1992) 
SIATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Couit should ie\eise the tnal couit's decision to giant a dnected \eidict, vacate 
its aw aid of attorney's fees to defendant C Michael Nielsen ("Nielsen") and lemand this 
case loi fuithei pioceedings This case involves Nielsen's failuie to fulfill piomises and 
obligations contained within an Earnest Money Sales Agieement and Indemnification 
Vgieement 
This case aiose out of Nielsen's sale to Justin and Kimbeily Pavoni (the "Paxonis") 
of a 20-acie paicel of pioperty in the Red Hawk Subdivision in Park City, Utah (heieinaftei 
the piopeity")(R at 916 921, 948, T n a l ! I pp 77-78, 97-98, 206, Pi's Tnal Exs 1 & 1A 
Dei \ Tnal b \ 6 ) The piopeity was an ideal site loi the Pavoni's dieam home, and the 
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Pa\ onis bargained with Nielsen and agreed in writing as part of the purchase agreement that 
they would be able to build their home at a specifically identified prime location on the 20-
acrepaicel. (R. at 917-19, 1000-01; Trial Tr., pp 81-92, 413-418; PL's Trial Exs. 1 & 1A.) 
Nielsen sold the property and the Pavonis agreed to buy it with the understanding that there 
would be nothing that would interfere with their planned home site and use of the property. 
(R. at 920-21, 943-44, 1001; Trial Tr., pp. 93-98, 186-88, 417.) 
Shortly before closing, however, Nielsen advised the Pavonis for the first time that 
neighboring property owners (the Calls) were claiming a right of way easement over the 
Pa\onf s property. (R. at 920; Trial Tr., pp. 93-94.) Nielsen knew, and had known for some 
time, that the claimed easement went through the Pavonfs planned home site, but he did not 
disclose this to the Pavonis. (R. at 920, 975; Trial Tr., pp. 96, 314-15). Instead, Nielsen 
minimized the issue and told the Pavonis that the Call easement would not be a problem, 
because he would take care of the situation. (R. at 920, 944, 1001; Trial Tr., pp. 94, 188, 
417.) Nielsen gave the Pavonis an Indemnification Agreement promising to defend and 
indemnify them against all losses and damages of any sort whatsoever that might arise out 
oi the Calls1 claim to an easement over the Pavoni's property. (R. at 920-21, 943-44, 1001-
03; Trial Tr., pp. 187-90, 341-42, 390-391, 416-427; PL's Trial Ex. 4.) 
Based on Nielsen's representations and the promises contained in the purchase and 
indemnification agreements, the Pavonis purchased the property for SI 15,000 in July 1992. 
(R. at 921, 1001; Trial Tr., pp. 98-99, 416-17.) In the ensuing two-years, in preparation for 
ultimately building their home on the property, the Pavonis made many improvements to the 
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20-acre parcel, greatly increasing its value. (R. at 923-24, 930-31, 933-37, 963; Trial Ti\, pp. 
106-12, 133-38, 146-63, 264; Pi's Trial Exs. 22, 23, 24, 25, 29.) In the meantime, the value 
of property in this subdivision also escalated generally. (R. at 977; Trial Tr., p. 323.) 
After the Pavonis purchased the property, Nielsen-instead of resolving the Calls' 
claim of an easement in favor of the Pavonis by extinguishing any claim of an easement over 
the property-settled the Call litigation in July 1994 and granted the Calls an easement 
affecting up to 2 acres of the Pavoni's 20-acre plot. (R. at 6, 925, 927, 929, 996-97; Trial Tr., 
pp. 113-14, 121-22, 130-31, 396-99; Def.'s Trial Ex. 9.) Most egregiously, the Call 
easement went directly through the Pavoni's planned home site. (Id.) Nielsen admitted at 
trial that the Pavoni's property burdened with an easement was obviously worth less than the 
Pa\oni's property without an easement. (R. at 974, 977-78; Trial Tr., pp. 309-11, 321-27.) 
Nielsen estimated the minimum reduction in value to be at least "a couple of thousand 
dollars." (R. at 981; Trial Tr., p. 336.) Nielsen's conservative estimate—which itself 
concedes that the Pavonis were damaged—does not account for the fact that the Pavonis were 
prevented from building their home at the location they selected. 
Faced with the imposition of an easement on the property running through their 
agreed upon home site, the Pavonis decided, in September 1994, to sell the property and 
attempt to recover their losses and damages caused by Nielsen. (R. at 963; Trial Tr., pp. 266-
67.) Reflecting the improvements that the Pavonis made to the property and the generally 
escalating land prices, the property was eventually appraised at $285,000. (R. at 963; Trial 
Tr., p. 266.) The Pavonis were ultimately able to sell the property for $282,500, or $2,500 
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less than the appraised value. (R. at 963; Trial Ti\, pp. 266-67.) The Pavonis were never 
repaid for the diminution in value, nor were they repaid for the costs of architectural plans 
that they had paid to layout the planned home site on the property, nor for all of the 
attorne\ *s fees that they had incurred in attempting to defend against the Call litigation and 
resulting easement. (R. at 921-22, 930, 940-41; Trial Ti\, pp. 100-02, 172-77; PL's Trial Exs. 
35A&35B.) 
In addition, Nielsen did not fulfill his obligations contained within the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement, including his promise to install a gravel driveway and widen the driveway. 
(R. at 921, 923, 930, 966; Trial Tr., pp. 100, 106-08, 133-35, 279; PL's Trial Exs. 1 & 1A.) 
SpccificalK, the Earnest Money Sales Agreement provided, inter alia, that Nielsen would 
install additional three-inch gravel from the driveway entrance to twenty feet beyond the 
western-most boundary of the Pavoni's selected home site within one hundred twenty days 
after the closing date. (R. at 919, 923, 966; Trial Tr., pp. 90-91, 106, 279; PL's Trial Exs. 
1 & 1 A.) Nielsen failed to install the above-described gravel road as promised, and ten 
months after the road was supposed to have been completed, the Pavonis paid approximately 
$4,500 to have it installed. (R. at 921, 923, 930; Trial Tr., pp. 100, 106-08, 133-35; PL's 
Trial Ex. 7.) The Pavonis asked Nielsen to reimburse them for the cost of installing the 
gravel road, but Nielsen refused to pay. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement also provided 
that Nielsen would widen and straighten the driveway entrance. (R. at 924, 966; Trial Tr., 
pp. 110, 279; PL's Trial Exs. 1 & 1A.) Nielsen did not widen or straighten the driveway 
entrance to the property as promised. (R. at 924; Trial Tr., p. 110.) 
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Therefore, the Pavonis filed suit against Nielsen seeking to recover for breach of these 
agreements, and also seeking recovery against Nielsen for fraudulent misrepresentations. (R. 
at 1-32 ) At trial, despite evidence of Nielsen's breach and the damages related thereto, 
including Nielsen's own admission of a diminution in the property's value as a result of the 
Call easement, the trial court directed a \erdict against the Pavonis on the Indemnification 
Agreement, finding that because they had made a profit on the sale of the property, they were 
not entitled to recovery. (R. at 610-15, 1011; Trial Tr., pp. 458-59.) The trial court 
overlooked the fact that the Call casement had diminished the property's value (R. at 974, 
977-78; Trial Tr., pp. 309-11, 321-27), and also overlooked proof that the Pa\onis had not 
been repaid for the various costs that they had incurred for architectural plans and attorney's 
fees that went for naught in light of Nielsen's resolution of the Call litigation. (R. at 921-22, 
930, 940-41; Trial Tr., pp. 100-01, 172-77; PL's Trial Exs. 35A & 35B.) 
In addition, the trial court directed a verdict and dismissed the Pavoni's claims under 
the 1 arnest Money Sales Agreement, finding that all promises and undertakings of the 
farnest Money Sales Agreement had merged into the deed of conveyance and been 
extinguished. (R. at 610-15, 1008; Trial Tr., pp. 444-47.) In doing so. the trial court 
overlooked the fact that the Pavonis sought to enforce promises in the Earnest Money Sales 
Agi cement that were collateral to and that were to be honored after the date of conveyance, 
and thus, were not extinguished by the conveyance itself. The trial court also ordered the 
Pavonis to pay Nielsen's attorney's fees because the Indemnification Agreement included 
within it a wtpre\ailing party" clause. (R. at 790-95.) 
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After the Court entered an order formalizing its directed verdict rulings and findings 
and entitlement to attorney's fees in favor of Nielsen, the Pavonis timely filed this appeal. 
(R. at 822-24.) Subsequently, the trial court entered an order reflecting the amount of 
attorney's fees to be S48,267.25. (Addendum at 10) The Pavonis have also appealed that 
order and have moved to consolidate the two appeals and address the common issues in this 
single brief. (Addendum at 11, 14, 15) 
II. SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On January 23, 1995, the Pavonis sued Nielsen for (1) breach of the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement; (2) breach of the Pa\oni Indemnity Agreement; (3) fraud; and (4) an 
accounting of monies paid to the Red Hawk Home Owner's Association. (R. at 1-32.) The 
Pax onis filed an Amended Complaint and Jury Demand on September 16, 1996. (R. at 72-
105.) The case was tried before a jury on September 1 and 3, 1998. (R. at 897-1013.) At 
the conclusion of the Pavoni's case, Judge Brian granted Nielsen's motion for directed 
\erdict and dismissed all of the Pavoni's claims, except the fraud claim. (R. at 610-15, 1008-
1 1; Trial Tr., pp. 444-59.) The fraud claim was presented to the jury, and the jury returned 
a verdict in fax or of Nielsen. (R. at 555-56.) 
On Januar\ 28, 1999, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
I aw and Order, wherein the court memorialized its decision to dismiss the Pavoni's claims 
for breach of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement and Indemnity Agreement and also 
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aw arded Nielsen his attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Indemnity Agreement.1 (R. at 
790-95.) The Pavonis filed the instant appeal on February 26, 1999. (R. at 822-24.) On 
April 27, 1999, the trial court issued a judgment, wherein the court awarded plaintiffs 
$48,767.25 in attorney's fees and costs. (Addendum at 12) The Judgment, dated April 28, 
1999, contained a clerical error as it awarded attorney's fees and costs to plaintiffs, instead 
of defendant, (kl.) By stipulation, this Judgment was amended on May 24, 1999, to reflect 
the actual ruling of the trial court. (Addendum at 13) On June 1, 1999, the Pavonis filed a 
second Notice of Appeal. (Addendum at 14) On June 18, 1999, the parties moved to 
consolidate the two appeals for purposes of briefing, oral argument and decision. (Addendum 
at 15) The Paxonis seek to reverse the trial court's decision to grant Nielsen's motion for 
directed verdict and vacate its award of attorney's fees and costs to Nielsen. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On or about March 31, 1992, the Pavonis executed an Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement with Nielsen for the purchase of real property located in the Red Hawk 
Subdivision, Phase I, and described as Lot No. 3 (hereinafter the "property"). (R. at 916; 
Trial Tr., p. 77; PL's Trial Ex. 1.) 
2. The Pavonis communicated to Nielsen their desire to build on a specific site 
w ithin the property and were adamant about the location of the house on the property. The 
1
 The January 28, 1999 Order did not specify the amount of attorney's fees and costs 
awarded to Nielsen. On October 21, 1998, a hearing was held to allow the parties to present their 
arguments with respect to the reasonableness and apportionment of attorney's fees. (R. at 837-
68.) 
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Pavonib clearly communicated to Nielsen that they had no interest in the property unless they 
could build on the specific site. (R. at 917-19, 966, 1000; Trial Tr., pp. 81-90, 277-78, 413-
15.) 
3. The Pavonis also communicated to Nielsen that they wanted to build on this 
pi ease area of the property because it offered an excellent view, privacy, and protection from 
the elements. (R. at 917, 1000-01; Trial Tr., pp. 82, 413-15.) 
4. To ensure that they would be able to build on their desired site, the Pavonis 
included Paragraph 8 of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, which specifically states that 
the transaction is expressly contingent upon "written acceptance, from the Seller, of the 
Buyer's proposed overall site plan." ( PL's Trial Exs. 1 & 1 A.) 
5. On or about May 30, 1992, the Pavonis showed Nielsen their desired building 
site, and he assured them that they would be able to build on site. (R. at 916-19; Trial Tr., 
pp. 81-90.) This was memorialized in paragraph 8 of the June 3, 1992 Addendum to the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement. (R. at 919; Trial Tr., p. 89; PL's Trial Exs. 1 & 1 A.) 
6. Just prior to closing, Nielsen notified the Pavonis that a Lis Pendens had been 
placed on the property by J. Allen and Margaret Call, whereby the Calls sought a right-of-
way easement over the property. (R. at 920; Trial Tr., p. 93; PL's Trial Ex. 3.) 
7. Nielsen represented to the Pavonis that the Call lawsuit had been commenced 
against himself and other owners of Red Hawk. (R. at 920; Trial Tr., pp. 93-94.) 
8. Nielsen further represented that the Calls' claims of right-of-way easement 
over the property would not present a problem for the Pavonis because Nielsen would 
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construct another road to satisfy the Calls' right-of-way claim. (R. at 920, 983, 994, 1002-
03; Trial Tr., pp. 93-94, 347-48, 423-26; PL's Ex. 38.) 
9. Nielsen repeatedly and consistently represented to the Pavonis that the Calls1 
claim would not interfere with the Pavoni's desired building site. (R. at 920-21, 943-44, 
1001; Trial Tr., pp. 96-98, 187-88,417.) 
10. In July of 1992, Nielsen and the Pavonis entered into an agreement whereby 
Nielsen agreed to, among other things, defend and indemnify the Pavonis "from and against 
any and all claims, demands, damages, losses, liens, liabilities, penalties, fines, costs and 
expenses (including attorney's fees), if any, arising directly or indirectly from or out o f the 
Call lawsuit (hereinafter the "Indemnification Agreement"). (R. at 920; Trial Tr., pp. 94-95; 
PL's Trial Ex.4.) 
11. In reliance upon Nielsen's representations that the Pavonis would have the 
unqualified ability to build on their desired site and that Nielsen would fully redress any 
adverse impact the Call lawsuit might have on them, on or about July 10, 1992, the Pavonis 
executed the necessary documents to close the sale/purchase of the property. (R. at 921, 
1001; Trial Tr., pp. 99, 417.) 
12. The Pavonis purchased the property for One Hundred Fifteen Thousand Dollars 
(SI 15,000). (R. at 948; Trial Tr., pp. 206-07; Def.'s Trial Ex 6.) 
13. By check dated July 28, 1994, Nielsen paid the Pavonis Two Thousand Dollars 
($2,000) for legal fees resulting from the Call lawsuit as required by the Indemnification 
Agreement. (R. at 930, 994; Trial Tr., pp. 132, 388; Pl/s Trial Ex. 6.) 
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14. In connection with paying the Pavonis Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000), 
Nielsen wrote Mr. Pavoni a note stating that he was not aware of the exact amount of 
attorney's fees incurred by the Pavonis, and inviting the Pavonis to contact him if the fees 
exceeded $2,000. (PL's Trial Ex. 6.) 
15. The Pavonis incurred legal fees in excess of $2,000 as a result of the Call 
litigation. (R. at 930, 940-41; Trial Tr., pp. 132-35; PL's Trial Exs. 35A & 35B.) 
16. The Pavonis demanded that Nielsen reimburse them for the legal fees incurred 
as a result of the Call litigation. (R. at 994; Trial Tr., p. 391; PL's Trial Ex. 17.) 
17. Nielsen did not reimburse the Pavonis for legal fees in excess of $2,000 
incurred as a result of the Call litigation. (R. at 26, 29, 97-98.) 
18. The Addendum dated June 3, 1992 to the Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
provided in paragraph 9 that Nielsen would install additional three-inch gravel from the 
driveway entrance on the property to a point twenty feet beyond the Western-most boundary 
of the Pavoni's selected home site within one hundred twenty days from the closing date. 
(R. at 919, 923, 966; Trial Tr., pp. 90-91, 106, 279; PL's Trial Exs. 1 & 1A.) 
19. Nielsen failed to install the above-described gravel road as promised, and ten 
months after the road was supposed to have been completed, the Pavonis had it installed at 
their own expense in the amount of approximately Four Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($4,500). (R. at 921, 923, 930; Trial Tr., pp. 100, 102-03, 133-35; PL's Trial Ex. 7.) 
20. The Pavonis made demand on Nielsen for the amount it took to have the gravel 
road installed, and Nielsen refused to pay. (R. at 27-28.) 
12 
21 The Addendum dated June 3, 1992 to the Earnest Money Sales Agieement 
pio\ idcd in paiagiaph 9 that Nielsen would widen and stiaighten the duveway entiance, as 
he had pieuously piomised the Pa\oms on oi about May 30, 1992 (R at 924, 966, Tnal 
11 pp 109-10, 279, P i ' s Tnal Cxs 1 & 1A ) 
22 Nielsen did not widen oi stiaighten the duveway entiance to the Piopeity 
(R at 924, Tnal Ti , p 110) 
23 In the Spnng of 1993 the Pavonis contiacted with an aichitect to piepaie 
constitution plans foi a custom home on the selected building site foi Five Thousand Five 
Ilundicd Dollais (S5,500) (R at 921-22, Tnal Ti , pp 100-01) 
24 The Pa\onis made numeious impiovements to the piopeity including, intei 
aha, installing utility lines that mcieased the value of the piopeity (R at 923-24, 930-31, 
933-37, 963, Tnal Ti , pp 106-12, 133-38, 146-63, 264, Tnal Exs 22, 23, 24, 25, 29 ) 
25 In connection with lesolvmg the Call lawsuit, Nielsen gianted a light-of-way 
casement thiough the pioperty and dnectly thiough the Pavoni's selected building site (R 
at 6, 924, 927, 929, 975-76, Tnal l i , pp 112-14,315-19, 121-22, Def 's Tnal Ex 9 ) 
26 The Call easement occupied up to 2 acies of the Pavonis 20-acre pioperty (R 
at 977, I n a l l i , pp 320-21 ) 
27 The Call easement inteifeied with the Pavoni's ability to construct then home 
on thui desned building site (R at 944, 967, Tnal Ti , p 191 ) 
28 The Call easement also lendcied the Pavoni's aichitectuial plans and 
topogiaphical studies useless (R at 968, Tnal Ti , pp 284-85 ) 
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29 Because ol the Call's easement passed dnectly thiough the Pavoni's desned 
building site, the Pavonis decided to sell then pioperty and attempt to tecovei any and all 
losses due to the Call easement fiom Nielsen (R at 929, Tnal Tt , p 131 ) 
30 Between 1992 and 1994, the values of the piopeities in the Red Hawk 
Subdivision escalated (R at 977, Tnal Ti , p 323) 
^ 1 In Septembei, 1994, as a lesult of the escalating land values and because of 
substantial impio\ements the Pavonis made to the pioperty, the Pavonis sold then piopeily 
foi $282,500 (R at 963, Tnal Ti , pp 265-66 ) 
32 I he selling pi ice, howe\ei, was $2,500 below the piopeity's appiaised value 
(R at 963, HialTi , pp 265-66) 
11 Nielsen nevci paid the Pavonis foi the diminution in value of the pioperty by 
the imposition of the casement The Pa\onis weie also not leimbuised foi the aichitectuial 
plans (S5,500), noi foi then attorney's fees inclined in defending and assessing the 
implications of the Call lawsuit (R at 1-32 , PI 's Trial Ex 17) 
}4 Despite the evidence ol these damages, the tnal court duected a veidict on the 
indemnification claim, finding no damage meiely because the Pavoms sold then pioperty foi 
a pi oilt o\ci then onginal pin chase pi ice (R at 610-15, 1011, Tnal Ti , pp 458-59 ) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The tnal court cnoneously duected a veidict and dismissed the Pavom's claim that 
Nielsen bleached the Indemnification Agieement The tnal court based its decision on its 
finding that because the Pa\onis sold then pioperty foi a piofit, they did not piesent any 
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evidence that they weie damaged by Nielsen's bieach of the Indemnity Agieement 
1 lowexu the Pavonis intioduced evidence at tnal that they inclined unieimbuised attorney's 
tees as a lesult of the Call lawsuit The evidence also demonstiated that the Pavoni's custom 
aichitcctuial plans weie lendeied useless by the Call easement and that the value of the 
piopeitv was diminished bv the easement which lesulted fiom the Call lawsuit At tnal, the 
paities disputed the effect that the Call easement had on the Pavoni's piopeity value The 
Pa\ onis howe\ ei, weie entitled to lecovci at least nominal damages, in any event, based on 
Nielsen's bieach of the Indemnification Agieement Theiefoie, it was impiopei foi the tnal 
couit to dnect a veidict and pi event the juiy fiom detei mining whethei Nielsen bleached the 
Indemnity Agieement, and, if so, the extent of the Pavoni's damages The Pavonis 
lespectfully lequest that this Court teveise the decision of the tnal court, vacate the 
accompanying awaid of attorney's fees and lemand the case foi a tnal on those issues as to 
which the tnal court dnectcd the veidict 
1 he tnal court also gianted Nielsen's motion foi dnected \ eidict and dismissed the 
Pavoni's claim that Nielsen bleached the tamest Money Sales Agreement The tnal court's 
decision was based on its conclusion that the piovisions, teims and obligations contained 
within the Earnest Money Sales Agieement meiged with the deed The tnal court ened, 
howevei because it tailed to lecognize that Nielsen's pi onuses to peifoim aftei closing aie 
collatcial to the sale of the piopeity, do not meige with the deed, and thus, lemain 
uifoiceablc aitci dclixeiy oi the deed The claims at issue in the instant case include, mtei 
alia Nielsen's piomise to install additional giavel on the Pavonis dnveway within 120 days 
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attei closing The expiess language of the Earnest Money Sales Agieement, as well as the 
testimony ot Justin and Kimbcily Pa\oni, indicate that Nielsen bleached this piomise 
1 hticioic the tual couit ened by not allowing the juiy to weigh this evidence and deteimine 
w hethei Nielsen bleached the Earnest Money Sales Agieement The Pavonis aie entitled to 
an oidei lexeismg the duected veidict and lemanding the case foi a tual on this issue 
ARGUMENT 
I SI A \ D \ R D O I REVIEW 
' Undei Utah law a paity who moves foi a duected \erdict has the \ery difficult 
buiaui ol show ing no evidence exists that laises a question of matenal fact " Alta Health 
Miatigiis. Inc v CC1 Meih Sen
 : 930 P 2d 280, 284 (Utah Ct App 1996), ceLL denied, 
916 P 2d 407 (Utah 1997) In addiessmg a motion foi duected veidict, "'wheie theie is any 
e\ idence that laises a question ot matenal fact, no mattei how impiobable the evidence may 
appeal, judgment as a mattei of law is impiopei "' Id (quoting Kleinert v Kimball Elevatoi 
Co , 905 P 2d 297, 299 (Utah Ct App 1995), ceit denied. 913 P 2d 749 (Utah 1996)) 
1 heicfoie in diiecting a veidict the [tual] couit is not tiee to weigh the evidence 
and thus invade the piovince of the juiy, whose pieiogative it is to judge the facts, but instead 
must simply examine whethei evidence laising questions of matenal fact has been 
piescntcd "' Alta Health Stiategics, Inc , 930 P 2d at 284 (quoting Management Co mm of 
Gia\siom Pines llomeowneis Assoc v Giaystone Pines, Inc, 652 P 2d 896, 897 (Utah 
1982)) 
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In the instant case, the trial court either ignored the above standard in granting 
\ i c K e n \ motion foi dnectcd veidict, or the trial court completely disregarded the evidence 
that was intioduced at tnal which piesented matenal issues of fact that lequued 
determination by thejuiy. 
II. THE PAVONIS RAISED ISSUES OF iMATERIAL FACT REGARDING 
NIELSENS BREACH OF THE INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT 
Particulaily when all of the evidence presented at trial is viewed in a light most 
\\\\ 01 able to the Pavonis, it cannot be said that Nielsen is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law rcgaidmg the Pavoni's claim that Nielsen breached the Indemnification Agreement. It 
ib not foi the court to weigh the evidence which has been presented. Because the evidence 
raised questions of material fact, the trial court's directed verdict was improper. 
The trial court dnected a verdict in Nielsen's favor and dismissed the Pavoni's claims 
that Nielsen bleached the Indemnification Agreement, because it concluded that the Pavoni's 
e\ idencc did not establish that they incurred any damage arising out of the Call lawsuit. (R. 
at 61 (J-15, 1008-11, Trial Ti\, pp. 444-59 ) However, in addressing a motion for a directed 
\ ei diet, the issue is not whether the evidence preponderates in favor of one party or the other; 
that is the lole of the juiy As long as the Pavonis have produced evidence raising issues of 
fact, then a dnected verdict is inappropriate. See Alta Health Strategies, Inc., 930 P.2d at 
284-87 In the instant case, the Pavonis presented evidence that they were damaged as a 
result of Nielsen's breach of the Indemnification Agreement. 
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1 he Indemnity agiecmcnt states 
1 Sellei does heieby agiee to indemnify, defend, save and 
hold haimlcss Buyei fiom and against any and all claims, 
demands damages, losses, hens, liabilities, penalties, fines, 
costs and expenses (including attorney's fees), if any, ansmg 
duettly 01 mduectly horn oi out of, the lawsuit Civil No 11110 
following the Buyei's puichase of the subject piopeity 
(R at 920, fual Ti , pp 94-95, PI 's Tual Ex 4 ) 
The indemnification that Nielsen piovided to the Pavonis puisuant to paiagiaph one 
of the agi cement is bioad Its language extends the sellers indemnity obligations beyond 
attorney's lce^ inclined in the Pa\onf s actual appeaiancc in the Call lawsuit The language 
ot the Indemnity Agi cement entitles the Pavonis to lecovei any and all losses, costs and 
expenses, including attorney's fees, "ausing dnectly oi mduectly fiom oi out of the Call 
I \\\ suit ' 
Despite the bioad language of the Indemnification Agieement, the tual couit 
disiegaided the evidence of damages inclined by the Pavonis as a lesult of the Call lawsuit, 
which was piesented at tual The evidence of damages included the cost of custom 
aichitcctuial plans designed foi a specific site on the lot, that weie rendeied useless by the 
giant of the easement to the Calls in settlement of the Call lawsuit Mi Pavoni testified that 
he paid ,\n aidutect $5,500 foi a suney, topogiaphic depictions, site plans and design 
If am question exists as to the meaning oi scope of the indemnity piousion, the teim* 
ol the agieement must be constiued against Nielsen, as its diaftei, (R at 990, Tual Ti , pp 374 
*)) and in i i\oi ot the Pa\oms See Jones, Waldo, Holbiook &. McDonough v. Dawson. 923 
P2d 1^ 60 1^2 (Utah 1990) i^L dlhQ Restatement (Second) of Contiacls ^ 206 (1981), 3 
Aithui 1 Coibm Coibin on Contiacb ^ 5^9 (1960) 
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specifications toi the home (R at 921-22, Tnal l i , p p 100-01) These plans wcie iendeied 
useless by the Call easement and the Pavonis subsequently decided to give these 
topogiaphical documents to the puichaset (R at 963-64, Tual Ti , pp 267-68 ) 
In addition the Pa\oms piesented evidence indicating that the \alue of the piopeity 
was diminished as a lesult of the Call easement In fact, upon diiect examination, Nielsen 
admitted that the Paxoni's piopeity value was I educed because of the existence of the Call 
easement 
MR TFSCH Sine If I undeistand you conectly, 
eveiy easement in favoi of a neighboi going acioss a piece of 
piopeity would diminish it, the value of the piopeity it's going 
o\ ei, in some w ay oi othei And it would be moi e depending on 
the seventy of the use of the casement9 
THE WITNESS Yes I would say that if I undeistand 
youi question conectly 
MR TESCH Uh-huh Eveiy piece of propeity 
does not ha\ e an easement \ eisus it does have an easement, then 
>ou aic saying that the piopeity with an easement would have 
a diminution of value9 That's a tuie statement7 
1 HF WITNESS Yes, I would say that's conect 
(R at 974 Inal Ti p MO lines 16-21 25, p 111 lines 2-7 ) 
MR TESCH [D]o you have an opinion as to 
whethei oi not that easement by judgment diminished the value 
of Lot 3^ 
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THE WITNESS' I would say that the value of the 
pioperty with that easement would be less than that property 
without an easement 
iM R TESCH* [H]ow much would the value of the 
lot have been diminished, what amount of money? 
THE WITNESS* It probably would have been a little 
bit. 
(R. at 977; Trial Tr., p. 321, lines 24-25, p 322, lines 13-15, p. 323, lines 11-13, p 323, line 
14) 
0 Mr Nielsen, based on all the hypothetical we have, 
assuming the existence of a roadway through the Call property 
that you agreed to in the judgment and that it had a like use only 
ioi the Call pioperty as it cunently exists and as it existed, 
lather, in July 1992, how much would that have Ieduced the 
value of Lot 3? How much money? 
THE WITNESS: I would say it would be a diminished value 
of possibly a couple of thousand dollars. 
(R at 981; Trial Tr., p 336, lines 6-12, 24-25 )' 
It is not disputed that the property appraised for $285,000 and sold for $282,500. (R 
at 963, Trial Tr., pp. 266-67; Def.'s Trial Exs. 1 & 7.) Nielsen contends that the sale's price 
of the property was not impacted by the Call easement, but, instead, was the result of a 
negotiation between the buyei and scllei, wheicm the buyei offeied $280,000 and the parties 
Nielsen also conceded that, depending on the extent of the use of the easement, the 
existence of the easement could dimmish the value of the Pavoni's property by as much as 50%. 
(R at 978, lual h , p 127 ) 
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met in the middle (R at 963, Tnal 11 , p 267 ) In contrast, evidence was piesented, in the 
foim of Nielsen's testimony, that suggested the value of then piopeity was diminished 
because ot the existence of the Call easement (R at 974, 977, 981, Tiial Ti , pp 310,321-
22 3 36 ) 1 he incuts of the parties' positions with lespect to the effect of the easement on 
the piopeit) value should ha\e been consideied by thejuiy 4 Unfoitunately, the tiial couit 
duected the \eidict in this case and pi evented thejuiy fiom lesolving whethei, and to what 
amount, the Pavonis had been damaged by the Call lawsuit and the existence of the Call 
easement 
In concluding that the Pavonis vveie not damaged by the Call lawsuit, the tiial couit 
ignoicd pioof that Nielsen leimbuised only a poition ($2,000 00) of the attorney's fees 
inclined by the Pavonis as a lesult of the Call lawsuit It is important to note that the 
indemnification agieement is not limited to attorney's fees inclined m the Call lawsuit, but 
is much bioadei, and coveis attorney's fees ansing fiom, oi inclined as a lesult of, the Call 
lawsuit 
In the instant case, the Pavonis intioduced evidence at tiial that they inclined 
attorney's fees and costs that constituted damages arising duectly oi indiiectly fiom oi out 
ot the ( all litigation Spccificall) the Pa\oms piesented Exhibits Nos 35A and 35B which 
set f oi th the attorney's fees that the Pavom's inclined as a lesult of the Call litigation 
Below, the Pavom's tnal counsel aigucd that the Pavom's damages foi the diminution 
ol then piopeity's value should be mcasuied at the time the Pavonis pin chased the piopeity (R 
at 1010, Tnal Ti , pp 454-55 ) Theiefoie, based on Nielsen's own admission, the Pa\onis paid 
SI 15 000 ioi piopeity that was woith no moie than $113,000 Nielsen's testimony in itself, 
constitutes pioof of damages (R at 981, rual Ti , pp 336-37 ) 
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I \hibits 3D A and 35B vveie intioduced and leceived into evidence (R at 551, 932, 939-40, 
lua! 11 pp 42 lines 6-23 169-70, 171-72, 174, lines 15-25) 
L \hibitb 35A and 35B demonstiate that the Pavonis paid at least $4,977 59 in 
atiomey's tees to lesolve issues lelated, eithei dnectly oi mdiiectly, to the Call litigation " 
It is undisputed that Nielsen paid the Pavonis $2,000 puisuant to his obligation to leimbuisc 
them foi damages including attorney's fees, lesulting either dnectly oi mdiiectly fiom the 
Call litigation (R at 930, Tnal Ti , pp 132-33) Attnal, Mi Pavoni testified that he paid 
moie than $2,000 in attorney's fees in a failed effort to lesolve the pioblems cieated by the 
Call litigation (R 930, Tnal I i , p p 132-33, PI s Tnal Ex 6 ) 
Specifically, Mi Pa\oni testified as follows 
MR TrscH Mi Pavoni, I'm handing you Exhibit No 6 and 
ask you it you lecognize that exhibit7 
A I do 
MR TESCH And this is check number-this is a check fiom 
Red Hawk Ranch payable to you foi the amount 
of $2000 foi attorney fees, is that light9 
A That is conect, sn 
Q And attached theieto is a note fiom Mike Nielsen, 
is that coiiect? 
A Yes MI, it is 
Exhibits 35A & 35B consist ot canceled checks made payable to the Pavoni's attorneys 
and invoices iiom the Paxoni s attorneys 1 he sum ol the checks and invoices enteied into 
L\ iduice thiough Exhibits 35A & 35B actually equals $5,929 56 The disciepancy between the 
exhibits and the tnal testimony is lendeied ununpoitant by the fact that both sums aie gieatei 
than the $2 000 that Nielsen paid to the Pavonis, and thus, constitute evidence of damages 
icsulling iioin Nielsen s bicach ol the Indemnification Agieement 
9? 
Q. Was that the total extent of the attorneys fees that 
you incurred up to the time that you had hired 
trial counsel? 
A. No sir. 
(R. at. 930; Trial Tr., pp. 132-33.) 
Accordingly, the testimony of Mr. Pavoni, together with the invoices and checks 
contained in Exhibits 35 A and 35B, is more than sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude 
that the Pavonis were damaged in the amount of at least $2,977.59 in connection with paying 
attorney's fees to resolve the issues that arose from the Call litigation.6 Evidence was 
admitted that showed that the Pavonis incurred attorney's fees relating directly or indirectly 
to the Call lawsuit that were not reimbursed by Nielsen. (R. at 930, 940-41; Trial Tr., pp. 
312-33, 172-80; PL's Trial Exs. 35A & 35B.) These attorney's fees constitute damages 
relating to Nielsen's breach of the Indemnity Agreement and, thus, render the trial court's 
grant of a directed verdict improper. 
The trial court's error appears, in part, to be the result of its failure to distinguish 
between attorney's fees incurred by the Pavonis relating to the Call litigation as contrasted 
with the attorney's fees incurred by the Pavonis in their suit against Nielsen. Fees incurred 
either directly or indirectly as a result of the Call litigation should have been considered by 
The record is unclear as to whether Exhibit 35 was also received into evidence. Exhibit 
35 consists of a summary of the Pavoni's legal fees in the amount of $8388.55. (Addendum at 
28) Exhibit 35 specifically states that these legal fees do not include fees that the Pavonis paid to 
their trial attorneys. This exhibit is contained within the exhibits in the trial court's record. 
Moreover, Judge Brian's clerk has marked Exhibit 35 as offered and received. (R. at 551.) 
Nielsen's counsel objected to Exhibit 35 when it was originally introduced into evidence. (R. at 
932; Trial Tr., p. 142.) The trial court did not sustain or overrule this objection, but, instead 
reserved this issue until additional foundation could be laid. Id. 
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the jury as damages at trial. Fees incurred in the Pavoni v. Nielsen lawsuit were properly 
reserved for post-trial consideration. On at least two occasions during trial, the trial court 
prevented the Pavoni's counsel from eliciting testimony to clarify that the attorney's fees 
constituted damages incurred as a result of the Call litigation, as opposed to fees incurred in 
the instant case. (R. at 941, 944; Trial Tr., pp. 178, 181.) The trial court mistakenly believed 
that any issues regarding attorney's fees should be resolved by the court after trial. Id. 
Therefore, the trial court directed the verdict without considering the attorney's fees incurred 
by the Pavonis as a result of the Call litigation. The trial court subsequently refused to 
consider these fees as damages at the close of the case based on the circular logic that it had 
already granted a directed verdict. (R. at 725-42, 865; Trial Tr., p. 29.) Either way, it was 
error—evidence of unpaid attorney's fees covered by the Indemnification Agreement was 
ignored. 
The cost of the architectural plans that were rendered obsolete by the Call easement, 
the diminution of the property's value and the attorney's fees paid by the Pavonis to resolve 
issues relating to the Call litigation, all constitute damages incurred by the Pavonis "arising 
directly or indirectly from or out of, the [Call] lawsuit." Accordingly, the trial court erred 
by directing a verdict and preventing the jury from considering the Pavoni's claim that 
Nielsen breached the Indemnity Agreement. Therefore, the Pavonis respectfully request that 
this Court reverse the trial court's ruling and remand this case back to the trial court for 
further proceedings. Upon remand, the trial court's award of costs and attorney's fees to 
Nielsen should also be vacated. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT'S DIRECTED VERDICT AND DISMISSAL OF THE 
PAVONPS CLAIMS UNDER THE INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT WAS 
ALSO IMPROPER BECAUSE, AT A MINIMUM, THE PAVONIS INCURRED 
NOMINAL DAMAGES 
While the Pavonis were able to quantify their damages through c\ idence introduced 
at trial, all that was required to defeat Nielsen's motion for directed verdict was to 
demonstrate a breach of contract, which alone supports an award of nominal damages. In 
Alta Health Strategies, Inc. v. CCA Mech. Serv.r 930 P.2d 280, 286 (Ct. App. 1996), cert. 
denied, 936 P.2d 407 (Utah 1997), this Court reversed the trial court's grant of directed 
\eidict 1 ike the instant case, the plaintiffs claims in Alta Health were dismissed because 
the trial court concluded that the plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence of damages. 
LI .it 286-87 In reversing the trial court, this Court recognized that: 
"nominal damages are recoverable upon a breach of contract if 
no actual or substantial damages resulted from the breach or if 
the amount of damages has not been proven." Turtle 
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 
670 (Utah 1982). Likewise, a party who has breached a contract 
will not ordinarily escape liability merely because the amount of 
damages is uncertain. Gould v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 
6 Utah 2d 187, 193, 309 P.2d 802, 805-06 (1957); accord Terry 
v. Panek. 631 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1981). Therefore, even if 
the amount of damages was not proven, the court still should not 
have granted a directed verdict on the breach of warranty and 
breach of contract claims. 
id. at 286. 
Here, Pavoni showed that Nielsen breached the Indemnity Agreement by settling the 
Call litigation, granting an easement through the Pavoni's property, and failing to defend the 
Pavoni's interests. (R. at 979-80, 991, 993, 996-98; Trial Tr., pp. 329-30, 332-33, 379, 385-
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86, 399-405 ) Accoidingl), the tiial couit ened by duecting a veidict in Nielsen's favoi and 
pie\entmg the Pavonis fiom picsenting then claims undei the Indemnification Agieement 
and ictovciing at least nominal damages 
i \ . I HI PAVONIS RAISED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REGARDING 
NIELSEN'S BREACH OF THE EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
WHIC H WERF NOT ABROGATED OR MERGED INTO THE DEED 
In gi inMng Nielsen's motion foi a ducctcd veidict, the tiial couit lehed on the 
doctnne of meigei The tnal couit held that the Pavoni's claims that Nielsen breached the 
Fainest Money Sales Agieement weie abiogated and meiged into the deed (R at 610-15 
1008 Tnal H , pp 444-47) 
The tnal court's conclusion was enoneous, howevei, because the Pavom's claims of 
bieach of contiact included claims that Nielsen failed to fulfill piomises contained in the 
Fainest Monc> Sales Agieement that weie collateial to the contiact of sale (R at 98-99 ) 
1 he tnal LOUII enoncouslv failed to apply the well-established exceptions to the meigei 
doctnne "The meigei doctnne has foui disciete exceptions (1) mutual mistake in the 
diaftmg of the final documents, (2) ambiguity in the final documents, (3) existence of lights 
collateial to the contract of sale, and (4) fiaud in the tiansaction " Maynaid v. Wharton. 912 
P 2d 446, 450 (Utah Ct App ), £erL denied, 919 P 2d 1208 (Utah 1996), accoid Secoi v 
Knight 716 P 2d 790, 793 (Utah 1986), Stubbs v Hemmeit 567 P 2d 168, 169-70 (Utah 
1977), Cmbassy Gioup, Inc v Hatch, 865 P 2d 1366, 1371-72 (Utah Ct App 1993) 
Paiagiaph O of the Earnest Money Sales Agieement contains an abiogation clause 
that piovides ' Except ioi expiess vvananties made in this Agieement, execution and delneiy 
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of final closing documents shall abiogate this Agieement " The trial couit adopted Nielsen's 
aigument that the exceptions to the meigei doctune weie inapplicable to the Pavom's claims 
because, upon dehveiy of the deed, the abiogation clause piecluded all claims not contained 
in the expiess vvananties (R at 612, 1008, Tnal Ti , pp 444-47 ) In Maynaid v Whaiton, 
y 12 P 2d 446, 449-^0 (Utah C t App ),ceit denied, 919 P 2d 1208 (Utah 1996), this Couit 
addiessed the effect of an abiogation clause with identical language as that found in this case 
The Maynaid couit stated that "[t]he abiogation clause at issue heie is typical, it provides 
"Except foi expiess wananties made in this Agieement, execution and dehveiy of final 
closing documents shall abiogate this Agieement" id at 450 In Maynaid, this Couit 
iecogni7ed that "[t]he doctune of meigei is "loutmely applied when an antecedent agieement 
contains an abiogation clause " Id (quoting Embassy Gioup, 865 P 2d at 1371 ) In fact, the 
Maxnatd couit stated that "[a]n abiogation clause is a conti actual statement of the common 
law doctune ot meigei ' Maynaid, 912 P 2d at 450 The Maynaid Couit then expiessly 
acknowledged the "foui disciete exceptions" to the meigei doctune which include mtei alia 
that lights expiessed in an Earnest Money Sales Agieement that aie "collateial to the contiact 
of sale" aie not meiged into the deed upon delivery. Id Theiefoie, contiaiy to Nielsen's 
aiizument below which the tnal couit adopted, the doctune of abiogation oi meigei does not 
ippl> to the bleaches of contiact asseited by the Pa\onis in this case 
In the case at bai, the Pavonis piesented evidence which laised issues of matetial tact 
legending Nielsen's bieach of the Famest Money Sales Agieement, including, but not 
ncLLssanly limited to, Nielsen's pi onuses of futuie peifoimance to make imptovements to 
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(he piopeitv As the Utah Supieme Court stated in Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P 2d 168, 169-70 
(I tab 1977) 
[I]f the onginal contiact calls foi peifoimance by the sellei of 
some act collateial to conveyance of title, his obligations with 
lespect heieto suivive the deed and aie not extinguished by it 
Whcthei the tcims of the contiact aie collateial, oi aie part of 
the obligation to conxcy and theiefoie unenforceable aftei 
deliveiy of the deed, depends to a gieat extent on the intent of 
the parties with lespect theieto When sellers peifoimance is 
intended by the parties to take place at some time aftei the 
deliveiy of the deed it cannot be said that it was contemplated 
by the parties that deliveiy of the deed would constitute full 
peifoimance on the part of the sellei, absent some manifest 
intent to the contiaiy 
Id (emphasis added ) 
"Collateial teims may take vanous foims " Embassy Gioup, Inc , 865 P 2d at 1372 
Poi example, in Stubbs, the parties executed an earnest money and exchange agieement 
w hich piovided that the sellei could iemo\e fiom the building "all equipment and shelving" 
except the "two walk-in cooleis with then cooling equipment " 567 P 2d at 170 In Stubbs, 
it was cleai fiom the testimony that the parties intended that plaintiff should be allowed to 
lea\e his equipment and shelving in the building until aftei the deliveiy of the deed 
Accoidingly, in Stubbs, the Utah Supieme Court found that the bleaches complained of by 
the plaintiffs ielated to futuie peifoimance by the defendant and, thus, weie not extinguished 
bv the doctnne of meigei id_ 
In dctcimining whethei the piousions m an earnest money sales agieement aie 
collateial to the deliveiy of the deed and title to the subject lot, it is necessaiy to look at the 
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paitics' intent Stubbs, 567 P 2d at 169-70 "When [the] sellers peifotmance is intended 
b\ the panics to lake place at some time aftei the dehveiy of the deed it cannot be said that 
it was contemplated by the paities that dehveiy of the deed would constitute full peifoimance 
on the pait of the sellci, absent some manifest intent to the contiaiy " Id. Stated anothci 
way the teims ot an earnest money conttact aie not extinguished by the meigei doctnnc 
*\\hen the dehveiy of the deed [is] less than full peifoimance of the sellers obligations " 
Id. 
In the instant case, the evidence mtioduced at tiial was moie than sufficient toi the 
jinx lo conclude thatw the dehveiy of the deed was less than full peifoimance of the seller s 
obligations " 1 he hamest Money Sales Agieement lequiied Nielsen "to install additional 
^ inch giavel fiom dnveway entiance on Lot #3 to 20 feet beyond Western-most boundaiy 
oi the home site within 120 days horn date oi closing " (R at 919, 926, 966, Tiial Ti , pp 
90-91, 279, PI 's Tiial Exs 1 & 1A ) The Earnest Money Sales Agieement also piovided 
that Nielsen would widen and stiaighten the dnveway entrance (R at 924, 966, Tnal Ti , 
pp 109-10, 279, PI 's Tnal E\b 1 & 1A ) This evidence was mtioduced at tnal by way of 
exhibit and thiough the testimony of Justin Pavoni, Kimbeily Pavoni and C Michael Nielsen 
Id At tnal, Nielsen and the Pavonis disputed what obligations vveie confeiied on Nielsen 
b\ these piovisions in the Earnest Money Sales Agieement Foi example, the paities 
disputed what amount of giavel was lequiied and what constituted stiaightening and 
widening the dnveway (R at 914, 946, Tnal Ti , pp 110, 199 ) What cannot be disputed, 
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hov\c\u, is that the language of the agieeincnt and the evidence introduced at tiial 
dcmonstiated that this woik was to be done aftei closing 
As a mattei ol law, the meigci doctune does not insulate Nielsen fiom liability foi 
piomises to pcifoim aftei the date of closing that aie collateral to the contiact of sale If the 
tiial comt had not euoneously dnected a \eidict in Nielsen's favoi, the Pavonis would have 
had the buidcn ot pioving then bieach ol contiact claims by apiepondeiance of the evidence 
\\ hethei Nielsen bleached the Tainest Money Sales Agieement by failing to peifoim 
m onuses which weie collateial to the contiact of sale is a question foi the juiy based upon 
the facts piesented at tiial Ihe tual court eued, as a mattei of law, by disiegaidmg evidence 
whicli laiscd issues of matenal lact and dnecting a \ eidict, lathei than allowing the juiy to 
detcimine these issues of fact Accoidmgly, the tiial couit eued in concluding that the 
Pa\onfs claims with lespect to Nielsen's bieach of the Earnest Money Sales Agieement 
meiged into 01 weie abiogated by the deed Thetefoie, this Couit should levetse the tiial 
court's giant of dnected \ eidict and lemand this case back to the tiial court foi fuithei 
pioceedings 
\ \ BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING THE VERDICT 
AND DISMISSING THE PAVONI'S CLAIMS, THE TRIAL COURTS 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO NIELSEN WAS ALSO IMPROPER. 
The Indemnification Agieement piovides 
If any legal action undei this Agieement 01 by reason of any 
asserted bieach of it, [t]he prevailing party ccshall be entitled to 
Upon luuand the tiial court s awaid ol costs and attorney's fees to Nielsen should also 
be \ acated 
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recover all costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney's 
fees, incurred in enforcing or attempting to enforce any of the 
terms, covenants, or conditions of this Agreement, including 
costs incurred prior to commencement of legal action. 
The trial court concluded that Nielsen was "the prevailing party" with respect to the 
dispute involving the Indemnification Agreement, based on the verdict which the court 
directed in his favor. Because the trial court's directing the verdict and dismissing the claims 
of breach of the Indemnity Agreement and breach of the Real Estate Purchase Agreement 
was improper, the award of attorney's fees to Nielsen is also untenable. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in directing the verdict in this case. The trial court failed to 
consider the evidence presented demonstrating that the Pavonis had been damaged by 
Nielsen's breach of the Indemnity Agreement. The trial court also misapplied the doctrine 
of merger. For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court's judgment, 
vacate its award of attorney's fees to Nielsen and remand this matter to the trial court for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this a 1S* day of June, 1999. 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
Alan Sullivan 
David N. Wolf 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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